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Understanding a Dispute About Ethnomethodology: 
Watson and Sharrock's Response to Atkinson's "Critical Review"
Martyn Hammersley
Abstract: Since its emergence, ethnomethodology has been subject to a succession of disputes, 
prompted both by external commentaries and by internal divisions. Often, the external 
commentaries have been rejected as displaying gross misconceptions about the character of 
ethnomethodology, and these misconceptions have frequently been all too evident. In this article I 
examine a less well-known case where the external commentary—a "critical review" by Paul 
ATKINSON—displayed considerable understanding of, and indeed appreciation for, 
ethnomethodological work; albeit alongside some criticism, and an argument for the fruitfulness of 
combining elements of ethnography and ethnomethodology. It also connected with some disputes 
internal to ethnomethodology. The response to this review was, nevertheless, sharp rejection. This 
was on the grounds that ethnomethodology is fundamentally different from the "constructive 
analysis" characteristic of conventional ethnography, and qualitative research more generally. The 
arguments on each side make this a particularly illuminating dispute. 
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1. Introduction
It has been a feature of the history of ethnomethodology that its adherents have 
often emphasised its radical distinctiveness from other kinds of social science. A 
key aspect of this has been a tendency to underline its differences even from 
those sociological approaches to which it has frequently been regarded as close
—by both external critics and more sympathetic commentators—such as 
symbolic interactionism and interpretive ethnography. [1]
This radicalism has been evidenced in a number of disputes over the years (for 
instance RAWLS, 1985; ZIMMERMAN & WIEDER, 1970). However, the dispute I 
will be examining here is less well-known than others because, while one side of it 
was a published article (ATKINSON, 1988), the other (WATSON & SHARROCK, 
1991) remained unpublished: it was a conference paper that was only circulated 
informally and that is not easily available. Furthermore, whereas other disputes of 
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this kind have tended to be marred by fundamental misunderstandings of 
ethnomethodology on the part of outside commentators, what is at issue here is 
more profound. ATKINSON's primary aim was as much to promote a broader 
interest in ethnomethodology on the part of qualitative researchers as to engage 
in critique; even though he does make some criticisms. [2]
ATKINSON argues that some elements of ethnomethodology/conversation 
analysis (EM/CA) can be, and to some degree have been, integrated with 
interactionist ethnography, but he recognises that no "grand synthesis" (1985, 
p.117) is possible. In response, WATSON and SHARROCK (1991) present 
EM/CA as a separate, self-sufficient enterprise, and one that is superior in key 
respects to conventional sociological perspectives; which they describe as 
seeking "to re-invent the (square) wheel" (p.1)—in other words, they view them 
as stuck in a futile rut. [3]
While this dispute took place a long time ago, there are important connections to 
discussions now taking place within ethnomethodology, centred on claims that 
some current work inspired by it, particularly in the field of conversation analysis, 
has moved away from GARFINKEL's original radical orientation and towards 
rapprochement with other approaches (BUTTON & SHARROCK, 2016; LYNCH, 
2016, 2018 [2016]). In short, the dispute examined here raises fundamental, and 
pressing, questions about the character of EM/CA and the prospects for mutual 
engagement with other forms of qualitative research. [4]
I will begin by outlining the dispute, and in particular the arguments of WATSON 
and SHARROCK (1991), going on to assess these in order to consider what 
scope they allow for mutual dialogue. [5]
2. An Outline of the Dispute
ATKINSON's article was published in the Annual Review of Sociology; a series 
that is more or less central to what we might call mainstream Anglo-American 
sociology.1 WATSON and SHARROCK's response to ATKINSON's review took 
the form of a conference paper whose title—"On the Provision of 'Ethnographic 
Context' in Ethnomethodological and Conversation-Analytic Research"—did not 
make explicit that it was a reply to a previous paper. Moreover, it was presented 
at an international conference on current work in EM/CA. So, this unpublished 
paper was not addressed to ATKINSON and mainstream sociologists directly, but 
rather to fellow ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts. Indeed, the 
authors explain that their concern is with the need to defend EM/CA from external 
attack, and how this can be done. ATKINSON's review is presented by them as 
an example of "criticisms by constructive analysts" that "are often misguided to 
the point of prejudice", and of the tendency of mainstream sociologists to 
"marginalise" EM/CA (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p1). [6]
1 There had been an earlier ethnomethodological contribution to this series by Aaron CICOUREL 
(1981), and there was a later one by MAYNARD and CLAYMAN (1991) on "The Diversity of 
Ethnomethodology".
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While WATSON and SHARROCK's announced focus is on one of the central 
issues in ATKINSON's review—whether ethnographic context is a useful 
supplement to EM/CA work—their main emphasis is on the distinctiveness of 
ethnomethodology: its coherence and self-sufficiency. They argue that even 
"sympathetic" outsiders like ATKINSON have failed to recognise its character. In 
response, they present arguments designed to insulate EM/CA from 
"incorporation" into conventional sociology and anthropology. They present it, in 
effect, as an embattled enclave.2 [7]
In line with this, early on WATSON and SHARROCK (1991, p.1) declare that: 
"our objective is to consider not so much why, but how ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis have been so consistently marginalized and to critically 
examine the devices in orthodox sociologies ('constructive analysis') whereby this 
marginalization has been brought about". This makes clear that they will not be 
engaging with ATKINSON's review on its own terms but will examine it primarily 
from the point of view of how it can best be countered, so as to defend EM/CA. 
Indeed, at one point they declare that their "only interest in addressing his work" 
is in the features of his argument that "are typical of many constructive-analytic 
conceptions and critiques of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis" (p.5). [8]
WATSON and SHARROCK begin by making two preliminary points. Firstly, critics 
(presumably including ATKINSON) do not recognise that what is offered in many 
ethnomethodological studies are initial investigations, rather than fully developed, 
finished conclusions; and that ethnomethodologists are, themselves, by no 
means uncritical of one another's work. Their second point is that the critics fail to 
offer an alternative approach that will solve the problems to which EM/CA is 
addressed. The implication is that criticism of ethnomethodological work 
frequently amounts to attacking those who are doing their best to find a way of 
dealing with difficult problems that the critics themselves refuse to face, or fail to 
deal with effectively. [9]
The authors then turn specifically to ATKINSON himself, positioning him as "a 
member of a group of British ethnographers who [...] claim to criticise 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis from a sympathetic and friendly 
position, offering advice and support" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.3). Use 
of the word "claim" here, at the very least, implies that—whatever the intentions 
of these ethnographers (of whom I am one, I should acknowledge)—the effect of 
the criticism is not sympathetic and friendly. The result, rather, is to further 
misunderstanding and marginalisation of EM/CA within the discipline. [10]
WATSON and SHARROCK then summarise what they take to be ATKINSON's 
main criticism: that ethnomethodology and conversation analysis "are insignificant 
without the supplementation of ethnographic context" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 
1991, p.3). They go on to say that "in his recommendations of how this 
2 Much the same attitude persists today. LYNCH (2016, p.6) notes approvingly that: "Garfinkel, 
Sacks, Schegloff and many others battled against 'friendly' efforts to integrate 
ethnomethodology with social psychology, cognitive science, symbolic-interactionist sociology, 
and psycholinguistics, among other fields and subfields".
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[supplementation] might be done, he re-imports presuppositions which 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis were designed to abolish, and to 
which they must, as a principled matter, be unresponsive" (ibid.). The authors 
then outline some of his arguments: that there is a tension between conversation 
analysis and ethnomethodology, and that "principled and selective trade-offs are 
possible and desirable" (ATKINSON, 1988, p.118) in combining ethnography with 
conversation analysis; that ethnomethodologists' distinction between topic and 
resource has been exaggerated; and that there are examples of 
"ethnomethodologically-informed ethnography" and of "ethnographically-informed 
ethnomethodology" that show the value of combining the two. [11]
It is also noted that ATKINSON treats LYNCH's (1985) study of science "as 
proffering a hyper-realist profusion of detail which ends up by losing all 
significance" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.7). In fact, this is part of a 
broader discussion by ATKINSON of the "studies-of-work" programme, one that 
is generally appreciative, but he goes on to argue that it involves "self-imposed 
limitations that are extremely radical in their consequences"; in that, for example, 
"the analyst seems bound merely to recapitulate the observed sequences of 
activities with little or no framework for selection [...]". And he claims that this 
"stance is sometimes justified by appeals to canons of natural science which are 
themselves problematic" (ATKINSON, 1988, p.446). [12]
WATSON and SHARROCK's central argument is that ATKINSON's approach in 
this article, like that of other "constructive-analytic" critiques of ethnomethodology, 
displays a commitment to "perspectivism", the position of MANNHEIM (1960 
[1936]), or at least "a vulgarized version of it" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, 
p.5). This treats perspectives as "restricted models of thought—thought 
conducted according to some limited set of terms, so that they can never reveal 
the 'full phenomenon' [...]"; in fact, that "in many ways, [they] comprise ways of 
not seeing" (ibid.). As evidence for this attribution of perspectivism to him, they 
note that ATKINSON refers to EM/CA as "an unduly restricted perspective" 
(1988, p.441), suggesting, for example, that "conversation analysis's focus on 
sequencing is a 'limited view' of the temporality of social life (1988:451)" 
(WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.6). More generally, according to them, 
ATKINSON "treats conversation analysis as suppressing the 'hermeneutic-
interpretive strand' of ethnomethodology in favour of a more 'narrowly empiricist, 
even behaviourist element' (1988:460), where the actor is reduced to a 'mere 
exponent of sequenced activities'" (ibid.). [13]
WATSON and SHARROCK examine the "anchorages in ordinary discourse" of 
terms like "perspective", which they portray in general as "a downranking 
procedure". They suggest that "the ad hominem quality of the perspectival view 
[...] can lead to the dismissal of a point of view without attending to its reasoning" 
(1991, p.7). The complaint here, then, is that ATKINSON has not looked carefully 
enough at the ethnomethodological arguments supporting what he takes to be its 
"restricted view". Instead, it is suggested, he relies upon "an assumed moralistic 
cast" or a "textually-generated moral climate", in terms of which 
"ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts are not only alleged to suffer 
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from 'tunnel vision' but are expected to feel guilty about it too" (WATSON & 
SHARROCK, 1991, p.8). WATSON and SHARROCK also argue that 
ATKINSON's "additive solution" (p.9) cannot overcome the problem, since (in 
terms of perspectivism) a broader perspective is still a perspective: it too will not 
comprehend the whole. [14]
As against this perspectivism, these authors deny the "'perception'-'object' 
division" built into it. They claim that for EM/CA "the object is not an ontological 
thing but a methodological thing, subject to methodological suspension and the 
like" (p.10). In other words, they suggest that "different methodological positions 
radically re-cast the object" (p.11). Thus, the authors present the kind of 
ethnography championed by ATKINSON, on the one hand, and EM/CA, on the 
other, as mutually exclusive. Here, they use the analogy of the sort of gestalt-
switch characteristic of one type of visual illusion: for instance where the image 
presented could be a rabbit or a duck. They argue that, rather than conventional 
ethnography and EM/CA addressing the same phenomena, each constitutes the 
phenomena it investigates quite differently: one studies rabbits, if you like, while 
the other studies ducks. And they cite WIEDER's (1974) investigation of the 
"convict code" as illustrating this gestalt-switch, and as showing that 
"ethnomethodology [is] a radicalization of ethnography" (WATSON & 
SHARROCK, 1991, p.15). [15]
It is on this basis that WATSON and SHARROCK argue that these two 
approaches cannot be merged or combined in the way that they take ATKINSON 
to propose. And they complain that "sociologists who in other contexts would 
perhaps take a Kuhnian incommensurability for granted do not necessarily 
continue in their conviction" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.11). The 
implication is that there are incommensurable paradigms here, but that 
ATKINSON is in denial about this.3 [16]
At the same time, as noted earlier, WATSON and SHARROCK do not present 
these paradigms as of equivalent value. For instance, they write that 
"if one wants to talk with fewer analytic presumptions about problems of 'identity' [a 
topic that Atkinson (1985) had used to illustrate his argument in a related article] then 
there just may be work in that area which does address the problem no less plausibly 
than Meadian social psychology [to which Atkinson appeals] [...]" (p.13). [17]
They continue: 
"This work may be seen as coherent in that it systematically works through the 
moves in a particular scheme; this working out, when taken over a set of 
contributions, might be seen as potentiating another type of comprehensiveness, not 
Atkinson's additive one but an endogenous comprehensiveness" (ibid.). [18]
3 The notion of incommensurability in the form of gestalt-switch continues to be used by some 
ethnomethodologists today to characterise the difference between their approach and 
conventional social science and philosophy, see for instance LYNCH (2016, p.11).
FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 20(1), Art. 1, Martyn Hammersley: Understanding a Dispute About Ethnomethodology: 
Watson and Sharrock's Response to Atkinson's "Critical Review"
And they cite MAYNARD's research on "perspective display" (1989) as an 
illustration to demonstrate the relative superiority of EM/CA over the sort of 
ethnographic approach to identity that ATKINSON (1985) recommends. 
WATSON and SHARROCK argue that what is produced by this 
ethnomethodological research "is clearly more closely-fitted for at least one task 
in the analysis of identities in conversation than, say, G.H. Mead's notion of 
identity" (1991, p.14). Furthermore: "it is a generative apparatus which operates 
in a way that, try as one may, it is hard to see Mead's as being when applied to 
these data" (ibid.). They add that "of course, the point is that the notion of identity 
in the Meadian tradition is designed to do other things" (p.14). But they conclude 
that what MAYNARD offers, or the elaboration of this they propose via the use of 
membership categorisation analysis, "fulfils the prerequisite of theoretical economy 
rather than weighing into the data with a ponderous, complex, florid and internally 
inconsistent theoretical edifice" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.15). [19]
Towards the end of their paper, WATSON and SHARROCK identify a number of 
issues that they regard as "pivotal" for ethnography: 
"how do professional ethnographers match up what their observed subjects do with 
what they say they do (given that saying is also doing)? More generally, how do the 
subjects themselves perform that matching activity? [...] How, in other words, do they 
procedurally go about establishing their shared sense of social structure as a familiar, 
self-describing state of affairs?" (p.16) [20]
WATSON and SHARROCK insist that ATKINSON "fails to appreciate the radical 
nature of the distinction between topic and resource" (p.17). They write: "This is 
not, as he claims, a matter of hyperbole but one of reasoned argument and 
exemplification: Atkinson fails to adequately address either" (pp.17-18). They 
declare that 
"In that Atkinson seeks to treat rules as a species of empirical generalization (by 
treating the ethnographic enterprise as purely inductive in nature), he utterly fails to 
understand Wieder's point that there is a logical gap which cannot be bridged" (p.17). 
[21]
What EM/CA offers, then, is "something analytically more generative than 
'straight' ethnographies, and, indeed, such ethnographies are now cast as 
pursuits of commonsense status, to be treated as the objects of analytic [that is, 
ethnomethodological] attention" (ibid.). [22]
However, WATSON and SHARROCK conclude by insisting that they have been 
arguing only that the assumptions underpinning EM/CA "comprise a free-standing 
set" that is "autonomous". They continue: 
"Even though they are ours, we do not, of course, regard them as mandatory or that 
they should have a monopoly in sociological analysis. Nor have we argued as such 
against anyone else's assumptions but have merely argued that their assumptions 
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are not mandatory either [...]. There are no privileged supervisory positions in 
sociological work" (p.18). [23]
3. Discussion
So, WATSON and SHARROCK's starting point is that, like other external 
commentators, ATKINSON has misunderstood the radical distinctiveness of 
ethnomethodology and the inseparability of conversation analysis from this. 
Where he finds overlap and scope for productive collaboration between EM/CA 
and the kind of ethnography he practises, they see an imperialistic strategy that 
must be resisted. At this meta-level, at least, it does seem that the dispute 
amounts to a clash of gestalten, as WATSON and SHARROCK claim. However, 
at other levels, this is not quite so clear. I will begin by looking at some of the 
specific points that ATKINSON makes and WATSON and SHARROCK's 
response to them. I will then examine their argument about perspectivism and 
consider whether this leaves any scope for comparing the two approaches that 
they regard as fundamentally at odds. [24]
3.1 Specific criticisms
ATKINSON argues that there is a tension between much ethnomethodological 
work today and the original spirit of the movement, which he regards as having 
been more compatible with the sort of interactionist ethnography to which he is 
committed. For example, he contrasts the technical focus of most contemporary 
conversation analysis with the hermeneutic and interpretive concerns that shaped 
EM in its early days; though he also identifies problems in the early development 
of ethnomethodology, centring on the very sharp distinction drawn between 
scientific and practical rationality. He cites the work of COULTER (1979, 1983), 
drawing on ordinary language philosophy, as an important countervailing 
influence to the shift towards a technical approach concerned solely with 
investigating the sequential structure of activities. He also discusses McHOUL's 
(1978a, 1978b, 1980, 1982) analysis of reading, as illustrating the connections 
between ethnomethodology and literary approaches: such as reception theory 
and classical rhetoric. [25]
Another example of EM/CA work that displays what ATKINSON takes to be links 
to the broader ethnographic tradition is ATKINSON's (1984) analysis of political 
speeches, and he notes parallels here with anthropological work on ethnopoetics. 
In addition, he treats some ethnomethodological studies of work as similar in 
important respects to other kinds of sociological investigation, perhaps most 
obviously in the field of science studies. At the same time, as noted earlier, he 
criticises the work of LYNCH in this field on the grounds that there is no criterion 
of significance applied to shape what is reported—no frame regarding what 
aspects of the work studied would have relevance to sociological problems. [26]
It seems to me that at least one of his arguments cannot reasonably be disputed. 
For example, he writes that: "In particular a tension exists between the specific 
treatment of conversation's sequential order and more general interests in 
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mundane reasoning" (ATKINSON, 1988, p.443). As he points out, this tension 
has been noted by ethnomethodologists themselves (see BUTTON, 1977; 
HESTER, 1981). And subsequent disputes amongst ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts have confirmed this, with some commentators claiming that 
conversation analysis has developed in an empiricist direction, neglecting key 
early commitments of ethnomethodology (see LIBERMAN, 2013; LYNCH, 1993, 
2018 [2016]; LYNCH & BOGEN, 1994).4 Furthermore, his specific argument 
about the need for ethnographic context as a complement to conversation 
analysis has also been put forward from within ethnomethodology by MOERMAN 
(1988). [27]
However, the defensive orientation of WATSON and SHARROCK's paper means 
that, for the most part, they do not seek to engage with the specific criticisms of 
EM/CA that ATKINSON puts forward. Where mentioned, these tend simply to be 
dismissed, as when they complain that he "fails to appreciate the radical nature of 
the distinction between topic and resource" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, 
p.17). This radical nature is not spelt out in their response. Similarly, they do not 
explain why ethnomethodologists adopt the "self-imposed limitations" that 
ATKINSON believes have undesirable consequences. Of course, the reasons for 
these commitments can be found in the ethnomethodological literature, but they 
are not unequivocal and in my view are by no means unproblematic 
(HAMMERSLEY, 2018a). And when ATKINSON uses a distinction that I drew—
between competence and action approaches (HAMMERSLEY, 1986)—they 
dismiss this as "shaky to the point of utter incoherence", but provide no 
supporting argument, nor cite any other publication where this can be found.5 
This attitude towards ATKINSON's review, the purpose being rebuttal, undercuts 
any possibility of dialogue. It reflects in part, of course, the fact that their paper 
was aimed at fellow ethnomethodologists, and was concerned with how they 
might defend themselves against external criticism. [28]
There are also some weaknesses in WATSON and SHARROCK's criticisms of 
ATKINSON's review. First, there are places where their portrayal of his position is 
unconvincing. An example is the implied charge that, like other critics, he was 
seeking to marginalise EM/CA. Yet, if marginalisation of this approach had been 
his aim he would surely have adopted the majority sociological response of 
neglect—rather than writing a review of ethnomethodology in a major journal. In 
fact, in some ways, it would be more true to say that it is WATSON and 
SHARROCK who marginalise EM/CA, since they insist on its radical 
distinctiveness from the mainstream.6 [29]
4 Of course, ATKINSON's conception of those commitments may differ somewhat from that of 
these internal critics, but I do not believe the difference is substantial.
5 Later, they imply that this distinction is incompatible with the idea that "language is constitutive 
of social action" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, p.4). But much here hangs on what 
‘constitutive' means, and they provide no clarification of this.
6 If their aim is not "regime-change", as they insist, then presumably what they want is a more 
pluralistic structure within the discipline; but they do not indicate why they believe this would be 
desirable, or why the present state of disarray is not already pluralistic enough.
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Moreover, in their discussion they emphasise ATKINSON's criticisms of EM/CA, 
downplaying the extent to which he highlights its value. Unlike some other 
external evaluations of EM/CA, his review is highly appreciative; and this, too, is 
surely incompatible with an attempt to marginalise it. He begins by describing 
GARFINKEL's work as "pioneering" (ATKINSON, 1988, p.441) and declares 
ethnomethodology "a force to be reckoned with" (p.442), as well as outlining its 
contribution across a variety of fields. In his Conclusion he summarises part of his 
review as follows: "It has been argued that contemporary styles of 
ethnomethodology have made major contributions to the sociology of everyday 
life in a variety of mundane and organizational settings" (p.459). Finally, he does 
not seem to be recommending the incorporation of EM/CA within ethnography: 
the term he uses is "rapprochement" (p.461). And, as I noted earlier, he explicitly 
rejects the idea of a "grand synthesis" (ATKINSON 1985, p.117), suggesting 
instead "more modest" "principled, selective trade-offs". Of course, questions can 
be asked about the terms on which these trade-offs are to operate. While one of 
ATKINSON's primary concerns was to encourage interactionist ethnographers to 
make more use of the insights and techniques of conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodological studies of work, this clearly assumes that the elements to 
be combined are compatible. However, while such borrowing may count as abuse 
from WATSON and SHARROCK's point of view, it is not in any simple sense an 
attack or even an imperialistic strategy of incorporation. [30]
Somewhat more challenging is ATKINSON's argument that conversation analysis 
would benefit from the provision of ethnographic context. This touches on a 
fundamental issue about how the relevant context for analytic understanding of 
any pattern of action is to be determined: must this be solely what is displayed as 
context by participants in the course of their actions, or are there features that 
they take-for-granted, or are unaware of, whose recognition would facilitate 
sociological understanding? WATSON and SHARROCK are correct that, in his 
critical review, ATKINSON does not engage in any sustained way with why 
ethnomethodologists adopt the first of these positions. [31]
3.2 Perspectivism
As I indicated, WATSON and SHARROCK accuse ATKINSON of adopting a form 
of perspectivism exemplified by Karl MANNHEIM's (1960 [1936]) "Ideology and 
Utopia". They suggest that this, "or a vulgarized version of it—has come to 
permeate the received corpus of orthodox sociologies in ways that are largely 
unappreciated by very many of its practitioners" (WATSON & SHARROCK, 1991, 
p.5). They treat this position as insisting that there are multiple perspectives, and 
that each one operates in such a way as to enable some things to be seen whilst 
others cannot be, suggesting a parallel with "the strong version of the Sapir-
Whorf thesis, where language or concepts comprise a kind of perceptual 
prisonhouse" (p.6). In addition, they note that ATKINSON uses the term 
"paradigm", which they suggest "in its Kuhnian conception in some ways 
operates as a synonym for 'perspective'" (ibid.). [32]
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WATSON and SHARROCK also appeal to the "grammar" of the use of 
"perspective" in ordinary language. They argue that, by suggesting that EM/CA 
amounts to "an unduly restricted perspective", ATKINSON (1988, p.441) is 
committing himself to the view that all perspectives are partial; and, as I indicated, 
they go on to point out that this would imply that even the broader one he is 
recommending would still be partial—that it too would not grasp "the whole". [33]
WATSON and SHARROCK are certainly correct to emphasise that most EM/CA 
work is guided by distinctive commitments that mark it off sharply from 
interactionist ethnography and the other kinds of work that ATKINSON mentions 
(see HAMMERSLEY, 2018a, Conclusion). It is these that lead to what 
ATKINSON regards as a "neglect" of context, a "failure" to examine surrounding 
aspects of the phenomena that are the main focus. Central to EM/CA, though not 
spelt out by WATSON and SHARROCK, is the idea that social interaction 
necessarily displays what is going on in a manner that is available to members; 
that this provides the possibility of a form of rigorous analysis that relies entirely 
on what is made observable in this way; so that the task of EM/CA is to document 
how social interaction constitutes itself and its environment, and thereby the world 
that we all experience as social participants. This is the basis for their argument 
that ethnomethodological analysis can achieve endogenous comprehensiveness. 
And this focus on social order as intelligibility is at odds with much ethnographic 
work—and with most conventional sociology. WATSON and SHARROCK are 
right, then, that there is a fundamental division here. [34]
However, the term "perspectivism" is ambiguous; and it is not clear from his 
article that ATKINSON is committed to any of the positions to which it can refer; 
or, if he is, to which one. As WATSON and SHARROCK indicate, an influential 
version of perspectivism holds that we can never grasp the whole, since all our 
understanding is partial: we always must operate from within a particular 
viewpoint. While each perspective reveals a different aspect of reality, 
perspectives cannot be combined to provide a panoramic view that would 
represent the whole. This is characteristic of some neo-Kantian philosophy, and it 
may have been the view of MANNHEIM as regards "total ideologies", though he 
seems to have harboured the hope of an ultimate synthesis (see KETTLER, 
MEJA & STEHR, 1984, p.35). This position contrasts with what we might call 
holism: the argument that a view of the whole (however defined) is immediately 
possible and is desirable. Now, interestingly, both of these views—perspectivism 
and holism—can support criticism of an account for not including all that is 
relevant. This is obvious in the case of the second, but even with the first a 
particular account could be criticised because it does not fully represent all 
relevant phenomena from within the perspective it adopts. [35]
ATKINSON certainly does argue that EM/CA is restricted in an undesirable way, 
omitting aspects of social interaction and its context that would be relevant to an 
understanding of it. But rather than this signalling his commitment to a specific 
philosophical position—perspectivism or holism—it seems instead to amount to a 
relatively mundane criticism, to the effect that relevant matters have not been 
given due consideration. Of course, his judgement here may be wrong or 
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misguided, but demonstrating this would require clarification of the sort of 
understanding being aimed at (as already indicated, there seems likely to be 
disagreement at this fundamental level between him and his critics) and what is 
necessary to achieve it. [36]
Interestingly, WATSON and SHARROCK appear to go on, themselves, to adopt 
a position that has sometimes attracted the label "perspectivism"—indeed, it is a 
more radical version of the position I have just outlined under this heading (and it 
too can be found in some neo-Kantian philosophy). This requires that even the 
assumption that there is a whole, or a single, reality—of which each perspective 
captures only an aspect—be abandoned (not just the idea that perspectives can 
be put together to provide a comprehensive grasp of the whole).7 I take this to be 
implied by their denial of the perception-object distinction. [37]
WATSON and SHARROCK seem to argue that the two approaches in dispute 
here—EM/CA and interactionist ethnography—must be treated as each 
constituting its own, distinct, object of investigation. Thus, the idea of any 
"correspondence" between an account produced from some perspective and 
objects existing independently of it is rejected. The gestalt-switch analogy (a 
notion also employed by KUHN, 1970) implies that from this point of view there is 
simply no basis for comparative assessment in terms of which one approach 
could be regarded as more restricted than, or as superior to, another. Indeed, 
these authors would probably argue that the metaphor on which the term 
"perspective" relies is inappropriate. Even MANNHEIM's proposal that it is 
possible to gain insights by adopting one perspective and then another, drawing 
out the lessons offered by each, without being able to integrate them immediately 
into a single viewpoint, does not make sense in these terms. It would be more 
accurate to say, with KUHN, that once we have entered into one paradigm we 
cannot make sense of others; even those that occupy or have occupied the same 
disciplinary field (SHARROCK & READ, 2002, pp.144-145). [38]
While this radical perspectivism certainly underlines the fundamental differences 
between EM/CA and the mainstream, it carries some complications. In particular, 
it seems to be at odds with the more phenomenological orientation of much 
ethnomethodology.8 Where the former insists that any understanding is always 
from some constitutive perspective, the latter claims that there is a kind of 
understanding that can capture phenomena in their own terms (see 
HAMMERSLEY, 2018a, Ch.4). As I outlined earlier, EM/CA insists that social 
phenomena are constituted publicly in and through processes of social 
interaction. This, it is argued, generates the world that we all experience within 
the natural attitude. But WATSON and SHARROCK's radical perspectivism 
implies that this view of social phenomena is simply one perspective amongst 
others, with a fundamental incommensurability reigning between them.9 It is thus 
unclear on what principled basis we could choose one perspective rather than 
7 It is quite close to what MACINTYRE (1988, p.352) refers to using this label. In some 
interpretations, KUHN (1970) also adopts this view: see SHARROCK and READ (2002, Ch.4).
8 See SHARROCK and ANDERSON (1986). GARFINKEL appears to conflate these two positions 
in his early writings (see GARFINKEL, 2006 [1948]).
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another. While these authors appear to dismiss KUHN's perspectivism, along 
with that of MANNHEIM, their position shares similarities with his account of 
scientific paradigms. [39]
3.3 Evaluating "incommensurable" approaches
Thus, WATSON and SHARROCK present EM/CA as radically distinct from, and 
therefore incommensurable with, mainstream sociology, including interactionist 
ethnography. This would imply no prospect of any comparative assessment of the 
two approaches, and therefore no grounds for choosing one rather than the 
other. However, they do not entirely adhere to this position: as I have noted, in 
some places they claim EM/CA is superior, which implies that comparison is 
possible.10 [40]
We can draw a parallel with KUHN's (1970, 2000) discussions of paradigms here. 
It is striking that despite his concept of incommensurability, and use of the notion 
of gestalt-switch, in practice he did not treat different paradigms as instituting 
totally different perceptual worlds. This is made clear by his argument that a 
successful new paradigm can both answer all of the questions answered by the 
previously dominant one and resolve the anomalies to which that paradigm gave 
rise. Furthermore, some of the reasons WATSON and SHARROCK adduce for 
believing that EM/CA is superior to conventional sociology are similar to the 
formal ones that KUHN mentions in his later discussions of paradigm change in 
the natural sciences: theoretical economy, or simplicity; and internal coherence, 
or consistency.11 Do these provide a basis for evaluating the two approaches that 
WATSON and SHARROCK regard as at odds, given that most people would 
probably accept that economy and coherence are desirable features of any 
sociological approach? [41]
While these authors claim that EM/CA is more economical and coherent than the 
alternative ATKINSON recommends, they offer little evidence for either claim—
they seem to take them as obviously true (perhaps because their audience would 
also do so). Yet there are questions about the application of both these criteria. [42]
One interpretation of "theoretical economy", perhaps the most usual one, 
concerns the number of variables that are employed to account for what is to be 
explained. But EM/CA is not a theory in this sense, nor for that matter is 
9 POLLNER (1978) took this position, arguing that ethnomethodology's superiority for analytical 
purposes lies solely in its being explicit about its own constitutive role. However, it is not clear 
that WATSON and SHARROCK would share this view (HAMMERSLEY, 2018b/Forthcoming).
10 At one point, they describe ethnomethodology as a "radicalisation" of ethnography. While they 
clearly regard this as a positive feature it is not immediately obvious just what this term implies, 
or why what it refers to is being evaluated in a positive way.
11 See, for example, KUHN's (1977, Ch.13) discussion of shared scientific values that guide 
paradigm change. There is a significant deviation here from his earlier account (KUHN, 1970), 
most notably in that he includes under the heading of ‘consistency' not just internal coherence 
but also the consistency of a candidate theory/paradigm with other theories/paradigms (he 
seems to use these two terms synonymously in his later discussion). At the very least, this 
suggests a modification to his earlier notion of incommensurability. KUHN went on further to 
develop this concept (see CHEN, 1997; KUHN, 2000).
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interactionist ethnography; and both tend to reject the validity of "variable 
analysis". We could, perhaps, interpret "economy", instead, as concerned with 
the relative degree of complexity (in the phenomena studied) that is assumed by 
the two approaches. That which involves a lower level of assumed complexity 
would be judged superior. However, I am not sure how we could go about 
evaluating the approaches in these terms. There is also some uncertainty about 
whether an assumption of less complexity would be the more desirable. For 
instance, a common complaint against orthodox economic theory is that the 
model of human behaviour it adopts is simplistic, and I suspect that WATSON 
and SHARROCK would agree with this (ANDERSON, HUGHES & SHARROCK, 
1989). At the same time, taking account of the full complexity of reality is surely 
impossible and the attempt to do this is undesirable (HAMMERSLEY, 2008, 
Ch.2). So, it seems that we would have to determine what is a necessary level of 
complexity, or what would be sufficient. But I find it hard to know how this could 
be done in general terms—much would depend upon the particular questions 
about the social world being addressed. It is also not clear that the two 
approaches being examined here are comparable in these terms. This first 
criterion, then, does not seem to provide much basis for evaluation. [43]
There are also difficulties with the other criterion: consistency. This too is a matter 
of judgement, and judgements are likely to be affected by the background of the 
person making the assessment. Furthermore, what is involved here is judgement 
about degree of coherence. What we could say, though, is that EM/CA is far from 
fully coherent: as MAYNARD and CLAYMAN (1991) show, it is internally diverse 
in character and there are conflicts amongst the rationales for some of its forms
—in fact, it is these that have generated the disputes amongst 
ethnomethodologists themselves. And in some cases the divisions are deep, as 
indicated by accusations that ethnomethodological principles have been 
abandoned (see, for example, LYNCH, 2016, 2018 [2016]).12 Of course, some 
internal conflict is to be found within interactionist ethnography (for discussion of 
one relevant area of disagreement, see HAMMERSLEY, 2017a); and in the case 
of mainstream sociology the internal divisions are blindingly obvious. At face 
value, it seems likely that we would be faced with a "dead heat" as regards this 
second criterion. [44]
As I have indicated, KUHN did not see paradigm change as operating entirely on 
the basis of formal criteria like economy and coherence. He also suggested that 
the relative value of competing paradigms would become clear through the work 
they produce; and, in particular, the extent to which a new paradigm could answer 
all the questions addressed by the previous paradigm as well as solving the 
problems that had arisen within it. If we look at another paper by SHARROCK 
and WATSON (1988), published around the same time, we find them arguing that 
ethnomethodology avoids the dualisms that have plagued conventional sociology, 
for instance between agency and structure or between micro and macro foci of 
12 To some extent, this seems to count against WATSON and SHARROCK's claim that the 
adoption of EM/CA produces a gestalt-switch. Rather than a coherent new perspective (it's a 
duck!), we seem to have a perspective that not only involves sharp internal disagreements but 
also ones that overlap with criticisms made by outsiders, such as ATKINSON.
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analysis. So, could this provide a basis for some comparative assessment of the 
two paradigms they discuss? [45]
Once again, comparison in terms of this criterion is difficult. It is not just that 
KUHN's analysis was designed to deal with mature natural sciences, in which a 
single paradigm dominates most of the time (whereas sociology is "multi-
paradigmatic"), but also that the paradigms he studied all aimed at the same 
goal, in terms of the kind of knowledge to be produced. This is patently not the 
case with EM/CA and its rivals, since ethnomethodologists have explicitly 
announced a re-specification of the purpose of inquiry away from the 
preoccupation of mainstream sociology with theoretical explanation, and towards 
an entirely descriptive discipline (BUTTON, 1991). Indeed, this was SHARROCK 
and WATSON's (1988) core argument in their earlier paper. In this respect, 
ethnomethodology proposes a much more fundamental re-specification of the 
field as compared to any of the new paradigms investigated by KUHN. In other 
words, the problem is not just whether we can obtain evidence with which to 
compare paradigms, the paradigms are likely to differ as regards the very terms in 
which they should be judged and therefore over what would count as evidence. [46]
While GARFINKEL (1967) presents ethnomethodology as concerned with 
showing how social order is achieved—and this has sometimes been treated as 
the main focus of sociology, notably by PARSONS—most sociological work has 
not been centrally concerned with this issue. Rather, it has focused on a host of 
more substantive problems: from the existence, scale, and causes of poverty or 
inequalities of various kinds to the nature and social function of religion; from the 
distinctive character of the professions to the role of the state in capitalist society. 
Moreover, where sociology has addressed the issue of social order, the meaning 
of that concept has usually been defined by contrasting it with the presence of 
conflict and violence—whereas GARFINKEL's focus is on how the intelligibility of 
social scenes is produced, this being treated as a prerequisite for the 
coordination of social actions. Clearly, coordination is not cooperation: as 
GARFINKEL (2006 [1948], p.114) has himself pointed out, riots are orderly. 
Similarly, the convict code that WIEDER (1974) studied formed part of a 
conflictual relationship between staff and inmates in the halfway house where he 
carried out his research. So, what GARFINKEL meant by "social order" is 
significantly different from what PARSONS and other sociologists have intended 
by that phrase. [47]
Given this fundamental difference in focus, it seems clear that KUHN's account of 
how one paradigm can be judged superior to another on the basis of the findings 
produced (according to whether anomalies have been resolved and previous 
knowledge preserved, albeit in a new form) does not apply in this case. Indeed, 
we seem to be thrown back on the other causes of paradigm-change he 
mentions, such as conversion experiences and the replacement of one 
generation of scientists by another. But these provide no basis for the claim that 
one paradigm is superior, they only indicate that it may be more successful in 
recruitment terms. Moreover, EM/CA does not seem to have out-performed other 
approaches in this respect, despite its longevity. [48]
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There is one other criterion that WATSON and SHARROCK mention. At one 
point they suggest that an EM/CA approach to the study of identity is superior to 
an interactionist one because it provides a "generative apparatus" (WATSON & 
SHARROCK, 1991, p.14). And, in another place, they remark that 
ethnomethodology offers "something analytically more generative than 'straight' 
ethnographies [...]" (p.17). The authors do not explain what they mean by 
"generative" here, but the reference is to SACKS' conception of rigorous social 
scientific inquiry as specifying a "machinery" or an "apparatus" that produces the 
phenomenon to be understood (SACKS, 1984, p.26, 1992, p.169). He presents 
this in the context of his analysis of a child's story—"the baby cried, the mummy 
picked it up"—where what is to be explicated is why we hear the "mummy" as the 
mother of the baby. And conversation analytic work focusing on sequential 
structures can also be formulated in similar "generative" terms (SACKS et al., 
1974). However, the status and character of this knowledge is in dispute within 
EM/CA, along with the issue of whether there are context-transcendent methods 
that would be generative in this sense (HERITAGE, 2016, 2018; LYNCH, 1993, 
2016, 2018 [2016]; WATSON, 2008; WILSON, 2012). [49]
There is also a question about why this generative model should be regarded as 
superior to the sorts of explanation put forward by conventional sociologists. It 
could be argued that conversation analysis has demonstrated that it can meet its 
goals, whereas mainstream sociology has recurrently been recognised as failing 
to do this, even by its own practitioners. But, even if this is the case, it may also 
be true of other kinds of ethnomethodological investigation, such as studies of 
work (HAMMERSLEY, 2018a, Ch.3) Moreover, changing the focus of inquiry to 
one where recognisably sound knowledge can be achieved more easily is not 
automatically justified. To warrant this we would need to establish that the 
grounds for judgements about the failure of conventional social science are 
sound. Also required would be strong evidence that conventional social science is 
incapable of producing worthwhile knowledge about its traditional topics. That this 
is the case has certainly been asserted by some ethnomethodologists (see 
BUTTON, CRABTREE, ROUNCEFIELD & TOLMIE, 2015, p.137; HUTCHINSON, 
READ & SHARROCK, 2008). However, in doing so they rely upon a conception 
of rigour that, in my view, is unattainable and unnecessary; one that 
ethnomethodology probably cannot meet itself (HAMMERSLEY 2017b; 2018a, 
Ch.4 and Conclusion); and, indeed, one that seems to be challenged by some 
ethnomethodologists, since it relies upon a sharp distinction between analytic and 
common-sense investigations (for instance LYNCH, 1993). [50]
FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 20(1), Art. 1, Martyn Hammersley: Understanding a Dispute About Ethnomethodology: 
Watson and Sharrock's Response to Atkinson's "Critical Review"
4. Conclusion
Since the late 1960s and 70s there have been recurrent disputes about the 
relationship between EM/CA and what have been widely regarded as cognate 
approaches. Initially, there was a common preoccupation across all of these with 
challenging the then dominant forms of sociological work, which were based on 
structural functionalism and survey methodology. But significant differences 
among these new approaches soon came to be highlighted by some 
commentators, and particularly by ethnomethodologists; by contrast, adherents of 
the other traditions—such as interactionism and interpretive ethnography—often 
tended to adopt a more eclectic approach, and sometimes this included drawing 
on EM/CA. WATSON and SHARROCK, on the one hand, and ATKINSON, on the 
other, exemplify these contrasting attitudes: what we might crudely label purism 
versus eclecticism. [51]
ATKINSON partly anticipated the reception of his review by ethnomethodologists. 
He wrote: "Attempts to establish common ground frequently falter in the light of 
mutual misunderstandings and reaffirmations of competing dogmas" (1988, 
p.461). However, he does not treat this as indicating an underlying, unavoidable 
impasse; whereas WATSON and SHARROCK argue that the very assumption 
that there could be common ground is misplaced, and that the parallels and 
connections that ATKINSON perceives are an illusion. I have argued that they 
are undoubtedly correct that ethnomethodology was always, and remains, sharply 
at odds with other interpretive approaches, but that their responses to 
ATKINSON's more specific points are not convincing. Nor, of course, do they 
show (or attempt to show) that, contrary to what ATKINSON claims, conventional 
ethnographic work cannot be improved by drawing on EM/CA. The key issue, 
though, is whether there is any possible ground for dialogue across the divide. [52]
Ethnomethodology had distinctive roots in GARFINKEL's inheritance of 
PARSONS' concern with the fundamental problem of social order, albeit re-
specified. By contrast, most of the other new approaches from the 1960s and 
1970s rejected this focus on social order in favour of an emphasis on action, 
conflict and change. Furthermore, ethnomethodologists were distinctive in 
criticising mainstream sociology for being insufficiently rigorous, for trading on 
common-sense knowledge. What was unique about GARFINKEL's work, then, 
was that it promised a solution to the problem of social order that at the same 
time offered the prospect of a highly rigorous form of empirical inquiry. He argued 
that people necessarily display what they are doing in and through doing it, and at 
the same time display their understandings of what others are doing via their 
actions. It is in this ongoing process that social phenomena are constituted as 
recognisably what they are to all participants, and through which social actions 
are coordinated. Moreover, since this process is a public one, it is immediately 
available to analysts as objectively describable in a way that the sorts of meanings 
of interest to interactionist and interpretive ethnography frequently are not. [53]
It follows directly from this that ethnomethodology involves a radical re-
specification of the focus of sociological inquiry. So, for example, in studying a 
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particular form of work, the primary concern of the ethnomethodologist is to 
document exactly what is involved in doing this work that makes it the distinctive 
kind of work that it is. By contrast, most sociologists would be interested in 
research questions that relate to such matters as: what factors shape the 
character and conditions of this work, how people define their work identities, 
their levels of job satisfaction, the political attitudes that are associated with those 
carrying out this type of work, the relationship between work of this kind and 
wider patterns in the division of labour and the exercise of power, and so on. [54]
It is ethnomethodology's focus on intelligible social order, commitment to rigour, 
and consequent re-specification of the sociological task that generates the severe 
difficulties facing the kind of dialogue between approaches sought by 
ATKINSON. The only way that such dialogue might be possible, I suggest, is 
through detailed appraisal of the fundamental assumptions of ethnomethodology 
as compared with other versions of sociology. In portraying social phenomena (in 
fact, all phenomena) as entirely constituted on particular occasions through 
processes of social interaction, ethnomethodology is sharply at odds with the 
assumptions that make up the "natural attitude", and the rest of social science 
(including interactionist ethnography), in much the same way as is HUSSERL's 
transcendental idealism (HAMMERSLEY, 2018a). The question that arises is: 
what grounds are there for treating this alternative ontology as true or useful—or, 
for that matter, as better than HUSSERL's? [55]
While this sort of appraisal is unlikely to offer definitive conclusions that will be 
accepted by all, it could clarify the nature of the disagreement and the strengths 
and weaknesses of the arguments on each side. MACINTYRE's (1988, Ch.18 
and passim; see also TRENERY, 2014) discussion of the rationality of traditions 
may offer a model here. He argues that even in the case of conflicting 
metaphysical or religious perspectives—his examples are Aristotelianism, 
Augustinian Christianity, AQUINAS's philosophy, and Enlightenment liberalism—
there is scope for fruitful dialogue. He suggests that there can be significant 
overlaps of one tradition with another, in particular areas, and that this may 
stimulate a process of rational appraisal on one, or both, sides. [56]
Of course, for this to occur, representatives of each tradition must engage with 
one another's arguments, whereas the defensive strategy that WATSON and 
SHARROCK adopt in their paper rules this out by its reliance upon a radical 
perspectivism that treats the approaches as deeply incommensurable; their 
stance here is in some ways analogous to DERRIDA's rejection of GADAMER's 
proposal of dialogue (see MICHELFELDER & PALMER, 1989). Ironically, this 
seems destined to preserve the very marginalisation of ethnomethodology within 
sociology about which they complain. It also reinforces the "multi-paradigmatic" 
state of sociology as a discipline, and that of social science more generally. [57]
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